The AI build-out in customs data
When people ask what a data centre needs, the answer is usually chips. This page asks something customs data can actually answer: over the last five years, which of the things a data centre is made of grew fastest in world trade? Deflated by US consumer prices, trade in transformers grew 71–117% between 2019 and 2024 while trade in integrated circuits grew 13–39%, and electric motors, pumps and compressors, which the same electrification buys, 1–67%. Growth in trade value is not a test. Our research note tests transformers flow by flow, 2023–24 against their 2012–2020 average: against its filed comparison of heavy machinery, transformer unit values stood +19% and tonnes +17% higher, but against motors, pumps and compressors the gaps (+10% and +9%) cannot be told apart from zero. The rise may belong to electrification generally, not to transformers, let alone to data centres. What stands out more clearly is one step upstream: China is now the largest exporter of the steel inside transformers.
World trade, 2019 and 2024
Values are world exports in current dollars; the growth column divides them by the US consumer price index, which puts the changes in constant dollars. That is not a measure of volume: if transformers became more expensive faster than US prices generally, part of their growth is price. Concentration is the share of world exports held by the largest exporters, on the same measure the rest of the atlas uses. The 2019 and 2024 figures are read in the 2017 customs nomenclature; the series further down uses the 2002 one throughout, because no single six-digit code spans both.
| Customs line | 2019 | 2024 | real change | largest exporters, 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The chips | ||||
| Processors and controllers HS 854231 | $228.4 bn | $389.4 bn | +39% | TWN 21%, CHN 15%, MYS 12% HHI 0.11, 202 exporters |
| Memory HS 854232 | $145.5 bn | $202.3 bn | +13% | KOR 38%, CHN 28%, TWN 14% HHI 0.25, 156 exporters |
| Other integrated circuits HS 854239 | $214.9 bn | $300.2 bn | +14% | TWN 37%, CHN 17%, SGP 8% HHI 0.19, 201 exporters |
| Often counted as chips, and not | ||||
| Photosensitive semiconductor devices HS 854140 Solar cells are most of this line, and light-emitting diodes are much of the rest, so it follows solar far more than it follows computing. It is shown because it is routinely read as a semiconductor line; it is not one. | $55.9 bn | $78.0 bn | +14% | CHN 47%, VNM 10%, MYS 7% HHI 0.25, 179 exporters |
| What goes into them | ||||
| Silicon, 99.99% pure and above HS 280461 | $3.2 bn | $3.6 bn | -8% | DEU 32%, USA 30%, CHN 13% HHI 0.23, 62 exporters |
| Rare gases (helium, neon, krypton, xenon) HS 280429 Dominated by helium, not the neon used in lithography: the top exporters are Qatar, Algeria and the United States. At six digits the code cannot separate the two gases; the US record can, at ten (below). | $1.8 bn | $3.3 bn | +54% | QAT 31%, DZA 17%, USA 16% HHI 0.16, 116 exporters |
| Niobium, gallium, indium, vanadium, germanium (one line) HS 811292 One customs line covering unwrought niobium, gallium, indium, vanadium and germanium together, with their powders and scrap, so a change here cannot be attributed to any one of them. The metals in the line also differ between nomenclature vintages. | $0.6 bn | $1.1 bn | +47% | CHN 29%, DEU 17%, USA 8% HHI 0.14, 69 exporters |
| Tantalum, unwrought and powder HS 810320 | $0.5 bn | $0.3 bn | -40% | USA 21%, JPN 20%, CHN 19% HHI 0.16, 37 exporters |
| What carries power to them | ||||
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, up to 650 kVA HS 850421 Liquid-dielectric (oil-filled) transformers only; dry-type transformers sit in other customs lines and are not counted here. | $1.7 bn | $4.1 bn | +98% | KOR 13%, MEX 13%, CHN 12% HHI 0.07, 127 exporters |
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, over 650 up to 10,000 kVA HS 850422 | $1.8 bn | $4.7 bn | +117% | CHN 19%, MEX 14%, TUR 12% HHI 0.09, 122 exporters |
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, over 10,000 kVA HS 850423 | $4.3 bn | $9.0 bn | +71% | CHN 23%, KOR 10%, TUR 10% HHI 0.09, 87 exporters |
| Grain-oriented electrical steel, 600 mm or wider HS 722511 | $2.2 bn | $3.3 bn | +24% | CHN 36%, JPN 29%, DEU 7% HHI 0.23, 47 exporters |
| Grain-oriented electrical steel, narrow HS 722611 | $0.5 bn | $0.8 bn | +20% | CHN 14%, JPN 13%, DEU 12% HHI 0.08, 55 exporters |
| Copper wire, refined HS 740811 Copper wire has many uses beyond data centres and grids. | $13.8 bn | $23.9 bn | +41% | DEU 14%, ARE 10%, BEL 9% HHI 0.06, 92 exporters |
| Other electrical machinery, for comparison | ||||
| AC motors, multi-phase, 750 W to 75 kW HS 850152 Electrical goods bought by the same electrification; the research note uses these four lines as a robustness comparison for transformers. | $7.7 bn | $10.3 bn | +9% | DEU 19%, CHN 18%, JPN 8% HHI 0.09, 165 exporters |
| AC motors, multi-phase, over 75 kW HS 850153 | $4.6 bn | $9.4 bn | +67% | DEU 16%, CHN 13%, MEX 10% HHI 0.08, 140 exporters |
| Centrifugal pumps for liquids HS 841370 | $14.7 bn | $18.3 bn | +1% | CHN 26%, DEU 10%, ITA 8% HHI 0.10, 175 exporters |
| Other air and gas pumps and compressors HS 841480 | $20.9 bn | $26.5 bn | +4% | CHN 19%, DEU 13%, USA 10% HHI 0.08, 200 exporters |
| What a new chip factory buys | ||||
| Machines for making semiconductor devices and integrated circuits HS 848620 Lithography, etching and deposition tools are all inside this one line; customs data cannot separate them. Singapore is partly a regional hub, so some of its share is equipment made elsewhere and shipped on. | $41.6 bn | $77.5 bn | +52% | NLD 26%, JPN 25%, SGP 15% HHI 0.17, 85 exporters |
| Machines for making boules and wafers HS 848610 | $2.3 bn | $4.0 bn | +40% | JPN 44%, DEU 18%, SGP 12% HHI 0.26, 67 exporters |
| Parts of chip- and wafer-making machines HS 848690 | $22.2 bn | $33.6 bn | +23% | USA 26%, JPN 18%, KOR 10% HHI 0.14, 150 exporters |
| Wafers: chemical elements doped for electronics HS 381800 Mostly silicon wafers, but any doped element or compound in wafer or disc form counts. | $15.3 bn | $17.8 bn | -5% | JPN 28%, CHN 22%, USA 10% HHI 0.16, 88 exporters |
| Photographic chemical preparations, including photoresists HS 370790 US Customs classifies photoresists here (ruling HQ 085914), but the line also holds other chemical preparations for photographic uses, so not all of it is photoresist. | $6.0 bn | $6.2 bn | -16% | JPN 57%, KOR 11%, USA 8% HHI 0.35, 124 exporters |
| Instruments for testing semiconductor wafers and devices HS 903082 | $5.0 bn | $7.0 bn | +14% | MYS 36%, JPN 19%, USA 10% HHI 0.19, 91 exporters |
After 2024: the EU and US records, to July 2026
World trade in the table above ends in 2024, the last year of the newest BACI release. The EU and the United States publish their own customs records monthly, and those run to January–July 2026. They show the same lines from one side only: what the EU imports from outside the EU, in euros, and what the US imports, in dollars. Neither is world trade, and neither is adjusted for inflation. 2026 is compared with the same months of 2025; the latest months are first releases and may be revised.
| Customs line | EU imports from outside the EU | US imports | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | vs 2024 | Jan–Jul 2026 vs same months 2025 | China, 2025 | 2025 | vs 2024 | Jan–Jul 2026 vs same months 2025 | China, 2025 | |
| The chips | ||||||||
| Processors and controllers HS 854231 | €22.2bn | +4% | +20% | 12% | $32.5bn | +15% | +23% | 3% |
| Memory HS 854232 | €2.9bn | +14% | +199% | 11% | $2.3bn | +23% | +217% | 4% |
| Other integrated circuits HS 854239 | €12.9bn | +1% | +18% | 11% | $6.4bn | -28% | +19% | 4% |
| Often counted as chips, and not | ||||||||
| Photosensitive semiconductor devices HS 8541.41–.49 | €9.8bn | -25% | +6% | 86% | $10.5bn | -42% | -25% | 2% |
| What goes into them | ||||||||
| Silicon, 99.99% pure and above HS 280461 | €125m | +30% | -25% | 14% | $188m | +84% | -53% | 1% |
| Rare gases (helium, neon, krypton, xenon) HS 280429 | €481m | -3% | -27% | 8% | $113m | -32% | +40% | 5% |
| Niobium, gallium, indium, vanadium, germanium (one line) HS 811292 | €111m | -25% | +2% | 29% | $207m | -24% | +14% | 9% |
| Tantalum, unwrought and powder HS 810320 | €11m | +18% | +188% | 24% | $147m | +1% | +67% | 17% |
| What carries power to them | ||||||||
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, up to 650 kVA HS 850421 | €318m | +14% | -9% | 25% | $1.4bn | -14% | -13% | 1% |
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, over 650 up to 10,000 kVA HS 850422 | €849m | +18% | +20% | 43% | $2.1bn | +47% | +2% | 7% |
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, over 10,000 kVA HS 850423 | €934m | +58% | +32% | 55% | $4.0bn | +38% | +11% | 2% |
| Grain-oriented electrical steel, 600 mm or wider HS 722511 | €523m | +35% | +16% | 57% | $32m | -55% | -38% | 0.5% |
| Grain-oriented electrical steel, narrow HS 722611 | €25m | -18% | -3% | 64% | $32m | -30% | +150% | 1.0% |
| Copper wire, refined HS 740811 | €407m | +37% | +86% | 0.1% | $1.3bn | -39% | -88% | 0.1% |
| Other electrical machinery, for comparison | ||||||||
| AC motors, multi-phase, 750 W to 75 kW HS 850152 | €1.1bn | +11% | +10% | 48% | $2.0bn | -3% | +1% | 8% |
| AC motors, multi-phase, over 75 kW HS 850153 | €1.1bn | +29% | -2% | 39% | $1.7bn | 0% | -24% | 6% |
| Centrifugal pumps for liquids HS 841370 | €1.1bn | +4% | +3% | 44% | $2.0bn | 0% | +5% | 13% |
| Other air and gas pumps and compressors HS 841480 | €2.4bn | +6% | -2% | 34% | $3.1bn | -18% | +8% | 11% |
| What a new chip factory buys | ||||||||
| Machines for making semiconductor devices and integrated circuits HS 848620 | €1.6bn | -37% | +204% | 2% | $7.0bn | -3% | -11% | 6% |
| Machines for making boules and wafers HS 848610 | €215m | -7% | -44% | 2% | $455m | -17% | -28% | 8% |
| Parts of chip- and wafer-making machines HS 848690 | €3.3bn | +1% | +24% | 3% | $4.0bn | -6% | +27% | 7% |
| Wafers: chemical elements doped for electronics HS 381800 | €1.6bn | -13% | -14% | 13% | $1.7bn | +9% | +16% | 5% |
| Photographic chemical preparations, including photoresists HS 370790 | €391m | -6% | -3% | 5% | $483m | -1% | -7% | 0.3% |
| Instruments for testing semiconductor wafers and devices HS 903082 | €314m | +7% | -5% | 4% | $540m | -23% | +8% | 2% |
Source: Eurostat
Comext, monthly bulk files (CN8) · US
Census Bureau, international trade API (HS10). Computed values:
out/ai_buildout_ext.json.
What the newer months add, line by line and without attributing any of it to AI:
- Memory chips. In January–July 2026 the value of memory imports was up 199% on the same months of 2025 in the EU and up 217% in the US. These are values, so the records alone cannot say how much of that is price and how much is quantity.
- Large transformers kept rising. EU imports of the largest units (over 10,000 kVA) rose 58% in 2025 and 32% in January–July 2026, and China supplied 55% of them in 2025. US imports of the two larger classes rose 47% and 38% in 2025, with China at 7% and 2%: the two markets buy from different places.
- Electrical steel. China supplied 57% of the EU's imports of the wide line in 2025 and 0.5% of the US's, the same split the research note traces. Imports are not supply: counting what EU mills make, China was about a quarter of the EU's electrical steel and a tenth of its transformers in 2024 (see the note, section 4.6b).
- Neon, in the US record. The US record splits the rare-gas line at ten digits (the EU's splits out helium but not neon). In 2025 neon, the gas used in chip lithography, was 0.8% of the value of US rare-gas imports, and helium 90%. The line’s value says almost nothing about neon.
- Photosensitive devices and LEDs, mostly solar cells and modules: US imports fell 42% in 2025.
Lines made of a few large shipments, such as chip-making machines, swing widely from one period to the next; a single year's change there is not a trend.
And the world, as importers report it
Countries also file monthly reports to UN Comtrade, which carry a near-world view past 2024. Each line below is the trade of the importers that filed every month of both periods compared (83 of them for 2024 against 2025, 52 for the half-years, because fewer have filed 2026), and each row says what share of that line's 2024 world imports those countries held, so a thin panel is visible rather than hidden. China, India and Taiwan do not file monthly, so they are missing as buyers — which matters most for the chip lines — but are counted as suppliers, because the panel's members report where their goods came from. Data to 2026-06.
| Customs line | 2025 vs 2024 | Jan–Jun 2026 vs 2025 | China, 2025 | panel's share of 2024 world imports |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The chips | ||||
| Processors and controllers HS 854231 | +22% | +14% | 15% | 71% |
| Memory HS 854232 | +14% | +224% | 42% | 51% |
| Other integrated circuits HS 854239 | +8% | +31% | 23% | 64% |
| Often counted as chips, and not | ||||
| Photosensitive semiconductor devices HS 8541.41–.49 | -18% | 0% | 54% | 86% |
| What goes into them | ||||
| Silicon, 99.99% pure and above HS 280461 | +13% | -1% | 14% | 45% |
| Rare gases (helium, neon, krypton, xenon) HS 280429 | -5% | -7% | 4% | 75% |
| Niobium, gallium, indium, vanadium, germanium (one line) HS 811292 | -19% | +37% | 30% | 82% |
| Tantalum, unwrought and powder HS 810320 | +23% | +80% | 26% | 90% |
| What carries power to them | ||||
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, up to 650 kVA HS 850421 | -1% | -11% | 13% | 83% |
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, over 650 up to 10,000 kVA HS 850422 | +26% | +13% | 24% | 86% |
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, over 10,000 kVA HS 850423 | +45% | +11% | 26% | 81% |
| Grain-oriented electrical steel, 600 mm or wider HS 722511 | +21% | -26% | 43% | 86% |
| Grain-oriented electrical steel, narrow HS 722611 | -8% | +28% | 15% | 83% |
| Copper wire, refined HS 740811 | +8% | -3% | 2% | 78% |
| Other electrical machinery, for comparison | ||||
| AC motors, multi-phase, 750 W to 75 kW HS 850152 | +7% | +5% | 21% | 83% |
| AC motors, multi-phase, over 75 kW HS 850153 | +16% | +6% | 18% | 82% |
| Centrifugal pumps for liquids HS 841370 | +6% | +8% | 22% | 72% |
| Other air and gas pumps and compressors HS 841480 | +4% | +4% | 21% | 81% |
| What a new chip factory buys | ||||
| Machines for making semiconductor devices and integrated circuits HS 848620 | +9% | -6% | 7% | 44% |
| Machines for making boules and wafers HS 848610 | -6% | -43% | 28% | 42% |
| Parts of chip- and wafer-making machines HS 848690 | +9% | +19% | 7% | 69% |
| Wafers: chemical elements doped for electronics HS 381800 | +6% | +25% | 32% | 65% |
| Photographic chemical preparations, including photoresists HS 370790 | +2% | +5% | 5% | 46% |
| Instruments for testing semiconductor wafers and devices HS 903082 | +19% | +38% | 3% | 53% |
Source: UN Comtrade, monthly imports as
reported by importers. Computed values:
out/ai_buildout_comtrade.json.
The same pull answers two questions filed for the research note, in
buildout-study/AMENDMENT_COMTRADE_2026.md.
The world panel tells the same story as the two national records: memory up 224% in the first half of 2026 (on a panel holding 34% of that line's world imports), transformers up in 2025, and China's share of the electrical-steel lines higher again. Values are in current dollars, so a rise mixes price and quantity.
What “building your own fab” buys
A company that decides to make its own chips does not escape the supply chain; it moves to the part of it that sells the factory. The machines that make integrated circuits were a $77bn line in 2024, up 52% in constant dollars since 2019, and its three largest exporters — the Netherlands, Japan, Singapore — ship 65% of it. The customs line that carries photoresists (along with other photographic chemicals) is narrower still: one country, Japan, ships 57% of it. None of this says anything about any particular company’s chip, its cost or its schedule, which customs data cannot see. It says who a new fab would be buying from.
Which of these actually move with the chip cycle?
A second question, and a harder one: when world trade in integrated circuits rises, does trade in each input rise with it? The table gives the elasticity from twenty-two annual observations (2003–2024), and beside it the smallest elasticity that many observations could have detected. Read the last column first: for most of these lines the detectable size is larger than any plausible answer, so the estimate carries no information. Both sides are in current dollars; the same inflation sits on both, but a common price cycle can still move them together without any link between the two industries.
| Customs line | moves with chips by | 95% interval | p | smallest it could see |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Silicon, 99.99% pure and above HS 280461 | +0.49 | -0.65 to +1.62 | 0.380 | 1.60 |
| Rare gases (helium, neon, krypton, xenon) HS 280429 | +0.39 | +0.12 to +0.66 | 0.007 | 0.38 |
| Niobium, gallium, indium, vanadium, germanium (one line) HS 811292 | +0.50 | -1.09 to +2.10 | 0.518 | 2.25 |
| Tantalum, unwrought and powder HS 810320 | +0.81 | -0.01 to +1.63 | 0.052 | 1.16 |
| Grain-oriented electrical steel, 600 mm or wider HS 722511 | +0.44 | -0.04 to +0.92 | 0.071 | 0.68 |
| Liquid-dielectric transformers, over 650 up to 10,000 kVA HS 850422 | +0.27 | -0.32 to +0.87 | 0.350 | 0.84 |
| Copper wire, refined HS 740811 | +0.91 | -0.21 to +2.03 | 0.107 | 1.59 |
Which lines are worth watching
Two things are true at once, and only one of them is about concentration. The transformer lines are small and growing fast, but they are less concentrated than the chip lines, not more: their largest exporters hold 13–23% of world exports against 21–38% for processors and memory. What is both small and becoming more concentrated is grain-oriented electrical steel, the core of a transformer. Taking its two customs lines together (read in the 2002 nomenclature, as in the note), world exports were $4.0bn in 2024; China's share of them rose from 12% in 2019 to 32%, and the three largest exporters' from 48% to 67%, partly replacing Russian exports. The research note follows this to July 2026: in the EU's imports the shift to China continued, while direct US imports of the steel still come mostly from Japan and South Korea. That makes it a material to watch, which is not the same as a demonstrated constraint — nothing on this page measures whether anyone was actually short of it.
Sources. Trade: CEPII BACI, release V202601 (Etalab Open Licence 2.0),
read through the atlas's single BACI reader, which applies the atlas's own quantity repairs. The
2019 and 2024 table is read in the HS 2017 nomenclature, in which those six-digit codes exist;
the chip-cycle series is read in HS 2002 for every year, so that no code changes underneath it.
Deflator: World Bank, US consumer price index (FP.CPI.TOTL). The electrical-steel figures are read
from the research note's output, out/buildout_study.json. Built by
build_ai_buildout.py from out/ai_buildout.json, which holds every figure
on this page.
Sources
- Trade, world. CEPII, BACI: International Trade Database at the Product Level, release V202601, used under the Etalab Open Licence 2.0. cepii.fr. Method: Gaulier, G. and Zignago, S. (2010), CEPII Working Paper 2010-23. wp2010-23.
- Trade, the EU. Eurostat, Comext monthly bulk files (CN8), imports from outside the EU, reused under the Commission’s reuse policy. ec.europa.eu.
- Trade, the United States. US Census Bureau, international trade API, general imports at ten digits (a US government work, public domain). api.census.gov.
- Trade, the world panel after 2024. UN Comtrade, monthly imports as reported by importers. comtradeplus.un.org. Only derived totals and shares appear here; the records themselves are not redistributed.
- Deflator. World Bank, consumer price index, United States (FP.CPI.TOTL), fetched 17 September 2026. data.worldbank.org.
- Photoresists in 3707.90. US Customs and Border Protection, HQ 085914, Photoresists (29 January 1990), classified in 3707.90.30, and its reconsideration HQ 087315 (10 September 1991), same heading; neither revoked, checked 20 September 2026. rulings.cbp.gov.
- The transformer study this page draws on. Critical Materials Atlas,
Grid transformers rose with all electrical equipment, and their steel moved to
China, with its pre-registration and amendments in
buildout-study/.
Every figure on this page is in
out/ai_buildout.json,
out/ai_buildout_ext.json and
out/ai_buildout_comtrade.json,
built by build_ai_buildout.py.