This is the answer to "so what do I do about a chokepoint." Diversified supply costs more than the incumbent — capital 20–150% higher, operating cost ~50% higher — and someone must bear that gap. But because the mineral is a small fraction of the finished product, that extra cost is absorbable downstream. The premium is economic insurance: a small, known cost against a large, uncertain one.
The exposure — what a full export shock puts at risk
IEA's estimate of the annual economic value of downstream production outside China that would be at risk if the October-2025 controls were fully enforced. Rare earths alone ≈ 7% of the combined GDP of the exposed economies.
The premium — drag the price shock
Pick a value chain, then multiply its critical-mineral prices. The grey bar is the mineral's share of the finished product's price today; the teal is the added cost. Assumes full pass-through of the mineral cost — IEA's own figures confirm the anchors (tripling rare earths → magnet +80%, motor +10%; tripling battery minerals → pack +36%).
Exposure vs insurance
The ratio between what a concentrated supply chain puts at risk and what it costs to defuse is roughly thousands to one. The cheapest fix depends on the mechanism: for by-product and geological chokepoints — tiny volumes, negligible cost share — a stockpile dominates; for thermodynamic and built-capability ones you must actually build capacity, but even then the downstream price impact is small enough to absorb. See Break the chokepoint for the per-mechanism playbook.
Source: IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — cost-share figures (pp. 234, 241-248), value-at-risk (pp. 235-240), stockpiling economics (p. 254). © IEA, CC BY 4.0.